Königsberg, 1724–1804
Immanuel Kant
Kant drew a line through reality. On one side, the world as it appears to us, ordered in space, time and causes, which science can know completely. On the other, things as they are in themselves, which no one can ever know at all.
The view
Kant set out to save knowledge from Hume's scepticism by turning the problem round. Instead of asking how our ideas manage to copy the world, he asked how the world must be if we are to experience it at all. His answer, in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), was that the mind supplies the framework. Space and time are the forms in which anything must appear to us. Cause and effect, substance and quantity are categories the understanding imposes on whatever it receives.
That guarantees that science works. Every possible experience will be spatial, temporal and causally ordered, because experience is built that way. But the guarantee has a price. What science knows is the world as it appears, not the world as it is apart from us.
What objects may be in themselves, apart from all this receptivity of our sensibility, remains entirely unknown to us. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A42/B59, our translation
The argument
The thing in itself must exist, Kant thought, since appearances must be appearances of something. But we can say nothing about it: not that it is in space, not that it is one or many, not even, strictly, that it causes our experiences, since causation is a category that applies only within experience. It marks the boundary of knowledge, and reason goes wrong whenever it tries to cross it, producing contradictions such as proofs both that the world had a beginning and that it did not.
Where he meets Deutsch
Kant saw that the mind is active, not a passive mirror. We never perceive raw data; we interpret, and the interpretation goes all the way down. Deutsch agrees that all observation is theory-laden, and that what we experience is a rendering built by the brain. Kant also refused to identify reality with what we perceive. The thing in itself was his way of saying that there is more to the world than appearance.
Where they part
Kant thought the framework was fixed and the limit permanent. Both claims failed. His space was Euclid's, and he thought its geometry was known with certainty; general relativity showed that space is curved. His categories ruled out an uncaused event; quantum mechanics, on most readings, appeared to contain them. The framework turned out to be a set of conjectures, and conjectures can be improved.
That removes the reason for the limit. If our ways of understanding can change, there is no fixed wall between appearance and reality, only explanations that reach further or less far. Deutsch's whole philosophy says that explanations can reach the thing in itself. Quantum theory describes a reality nobody perceives, the shadow photons and the other branches, and it describes it in detail.
| Kant | Deutsch | |
|---|---|---|
| What is ultimately real? | Things in themselves, which exist but cannot be known as they are. | Whatever our best explanations refer to: the multiverse, and emergent and abstract things too. |
| How do we know what is real? | Through experience, structured by forms of intuition and categories the mind supplies. | Conjecture and criticism. If our best explanation needs it, it exists: if it kicks back, it is real. |
| One world or many? | One world of appearances; whatever lies behind it cannot be counted. | Many. Our universe is one layer of a multiverse, revealed by quantum interference. |
| Is reality independent of observers? | Qualified. Things in themselves are independent of us; the world as known is shaped by the mind. | Yes. Observers are physical systems inside reality, governed by the same laws. |
Further reading
- Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783), his own short version of the first Critique.
- Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (1781; second edition 1787).
- David Deutsch, The Beginning of Infinity (2011), chapter 2, "Closer to Reality".
- Kant's Transcendental Idealism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.