Leipzig and Hanover, 1646–1716
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
Leibniz imagined infinitely many possible worlds, each complete in every detail, and argued that God surveyed them all and made one actual: the best. Three centuries later, physicists began to ask whether the others are real too.
The view
Leibniz was a mathematician, a diplomat, the co-inventor of the calculus and the designer of a calculating machine. His metaphysics was as ambitious as his mathematics. Every true proposition, he held, has a reason why it is so and not otherwise. When we ask why this world exists rather than another, the reason must lie outside the world, in God's choice.
God's intellect contains the ideas of infinitely many possible worlds, each a complete and consistent history. A world in which Caesar does not cross the Rubicon is possible, since there is no contradiction in it. God compared them all and chose the best: the world with the greatest variety of things, governed by the simplest laws.
There is an infinity of possible universes in the ideas of God, and only one of them can exist. Leibniz, Monadology §53 (1714), our translation
The argument
The building blocks of the actual world are monads: simple substances with no parts, each a kind of perceiving centre that mirrors the whole universe from its own point of view. Matter, extension and motion are how aggregates of monads appear to us, well-founded but not fundamental. And since monads have no windows, they do not act on one another; they are synchronised from the start by a pre-established harmony.
Voltaire mocked the conclusion in Candide, after the Lisbon earthquake of 1755: if this is the best of all possible worlds, what are the others like? But the structure of the argument outlived the theology. A space of possible worlds, each complete, one of them actual: that is the shape of every later debate about many worlds.
Where he meets Deutsch
Leibniz took many worlds seriously as an idea, and he insisted that every fact has an explanation. Deutsch shares the second commitment completely: a reality where things happen for no reason is a reality we have stopped trying to understand. Leibniz's binary arithmetic, which he related to the hexagrams of the I Ching, also anticipated the theory of computation that is one of Deutsch's four strands.
Where they part
For Leibniz only one world is actual, and the rest are thoughts in the mind of God. In Everett's theory the other branches are not possible worlds at all. They are as actual as this one, produced by the same law, and they interfere with ours in the double slit. Nobody chose them, and nobody needed to.
Nor are they all the worlds Leibniz could imagine. A world in which the laws of physics are different, or in which a bullet passes harmlessly through Caesar, is logically possible but not a branch of the multiverse. Deutsch's reality is larger than appearance but narrower than imagination: it contains what the laws of physics allow.
| Leibniz | Deutsch | |
|---|---|---|
| What is ultimately real? | Monads: simple, mind-like substances. Bodies are well-founded appearances of them. | Whatever our best explanations refer to: the multiverse, and emergent and abstract things too. |
| How do we know what is real? | By reason, guided by the principles of contradiction and sufficient reason. | Conjecture and criticism. If our best explanation needs it, it exists: if it kicks back, it is real. |
| One world or many? | Infinitely many possible worlds, of which exactly one is actual. | Many. Our universe is one layer of a multiverse, revealed by quantum interference. |
| Is reality independent of observers? | Qualified. Monads are real in themselves, but matter is how they appear. | Yes. Observers are physical systems inside reality, governed by the same laws. |
Further reading
- G. W. Leibniz, Monadology (1714), ninety short paragraphs.
- G. W. Leibniz, Theodicy (1710), on the best of all possible worlds.
- Voltaire, Candide (1759).
- Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.