Vienna, Christchurch and London, 1902–1994
Karl Popper
Popper is Deutsch's starting point in the theory of knowledge. On reality they agree about almost everything except the one thing this site is about: Popper never accepted the multiverse.
The view
Popper called himself a metaphysical realist. The existence of a world independent of us cannot be proved, he argued, but it is the only hypothesis that makes sense of science. Every test assumes something real that might falsify our theories. Idealism, which can never be refuted, is for that very reason not worth holding.
His world had three parts. World 1 is physical things. World 2 is mental states: experiences, intentions, feelings. World 3 is the objective content of thought: theories, arguments, problems, numbers, works of art. World 3 is made by us but becomes autonomous. Nobody made the infinity of the prime numbers; we made the number system, and the primes' infinity was a consequence we discovered. And World 3 acts on World 1, through us: theories of physics have reshaped the surface of the Earth, through the machines built from them.
After Popper: what is real is what can act on physical things, including theories.
The argument
Popper spent decades arguing against the Copenhagen interpretation. He thought it a disastrous instance of subjectivism: the observer brought into physics where no observer belonged. His alternative was the propensity interpretation of probability. Quantum probabilities, like the chances of a die, are real dispositions of the whole experimental arrangement. The wave function describes these propensities, and when one possibility is realised the others do not collapse in any mysterious sense; they simply were not realised, as a die that comes up six does not "collapse" its chance of a five.
The board is Popper's own favourite illustration. Tilting it changes the probabilities of every ball, including those not yet dropped. The propensity belongs to the arrangement, not to any one ball and not to our knowledge.
Where he meets Deutsch
Almost everywhere. Deutsch's realism, his hostility to instrumentalism and his rejection of the Copenhagen view all have Popperian roots. World 3 is a forerunner of Deutsch's reality of abstractions: theories and numbers are real because they make a difference to physical events. The knowledge site's Popper page sets out the agreement on epistemology in full.
Where they part
Popper considered and rejected Everett's theory. He praised Everett for taking the wave function realistically and for treating observers as physical systems, but he could not accept the splitting of worlds. His propensities, Deutsch argues, leave the central question unanswered. In the double slit, the propensity for a photon to land in a dark band depends on the slit it did not go through. Something real must be there to make the difference. Calling it a propensity names the effect without explaining it.
Popper was also an indeterminist, and wanted an open universe in which the future is not fixed. Deutsch's multiverse is deterministic as a whole, while each observer's future is genuinely unpredictable from within. The openness Popper wanted survives, but it is relocated from the laws to the growth of knowledge.
| Popper | Deutsch | |
|---|---|---|
| What is ultimately real? | Physical things, mental states and the objective contents of thought: three interacting worlds. | Whatever our best explanations refer to: the multiverse, and emergent and abstract things too. |
| How do we know what is real? | By conjecture and refutation. Realism itself is a conjecture, the best we have. | Conjecture and criticism. If our best explanation needs it, it exists: if it kicks back, it is real. |
| One world or many? | One world, open and indeterministic. | Many. Our universe is one layer of a multiverse, revealed by quantum interference. |
| Is reality independent of observers? | Yes. Realism is essential to science, and quantum mechanics does not refute it. | Yes. Observers are physical systems inside reality, governed by the same laws. |
Further reading
- Karl Popper, Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics (1982), his case against Copenhagen and for propensities.
- Karl Popper, Objective Knowledge (1972), chapters 3 and 4, on World 3.
- Karl Popper, The Open Universe (1982).
- David Deutsch, The Fabric of Reality (1997), chapter 2.