Christopher Fuchs, Rüdiger Schack, N. David Mermin and others, from about 2002
QBism
QBism, short for quantum Bayesianism, dissolves the puzzles of quantum mechanics by moving the wave function out of the world and into the agent. A quantum state is a bet, and collapse is just what happens when you learn something.
The view
QBism grew out of quantum information theory in the early 2000s. Its central claim is that the quantum state is not a description of a physical system. It is a compact summary of one agent's degrees of belief about what will happen to them when they act on the system, as in a measurement. Probabilities, in the Bayesian tradition, are personal: they express how much a particular agent is willing to bet.
On this reading the paradoxes vanish. The wave function "collapses" because the agent has learned something and updates their beliefs, as anyone does when a card is turned over. Wigner and his friend can assign different states because they have different information. Nothing travels faster than light in an entanglement experiment, because nothing physical changed, only someone's expectations.
After the QBists: a quantum state is a user's manual for an agent deciding how to act.
The argument
The Born rule, which gives quantum probabilities, becomes a rule of coherence: a constraint an agent's beliefs must satisfy to avoid sure losses, like the rules that stop a bookmaker being exploited. Quantum theory, on this view, is a theory of how to reason about a world that resists complete description, a world in which each act of measurement creates something new. The QBists deny that this is instrumentalism. They are realists about the world, they say; they are just not realists about the wave function.
Where it meets Deutsch
QBism takes seriously something Deutsch also stresses: that probability in quantum mechanics needs an account, and that the account has to do with decisions. Deutsch's 1999 derivation of the Born rule from decision theory and the QBists' coherence arguments are cousins. Both also agree that the world is not exhausted by any one observer's description.
Where it parts
For Deutsch, QBism is instrumentalism with a Bayesian face. The question was never what an agent should believe. It was what is going on in the double slit, and why the photon avoids the dark bands. Saying that the agent's beliefs follow the Born rule does not explain why the world rewards those beliefs and punishes others. A real wave function, branching in a real multiverse, does.
There is a second problem, about knowledge. On Deutsch's account, knowledge is not belief. It is information embodied in physical things, books, genes and computers, that causes itself to remain. Making the most successful physical theory a theory of personal belief puts the knower back at the centre, the place Popper spent his life removing it from.
| QBism | Deutsch | |
|---|---|---|
| What is ultimately real? | The world exists and is creative, but quantum states are not part of it. They are agents' beliefs. | Whatever our best explanations refer to: the multiverse, and emergent and abstract things too. |
| How do we know what is real? | Through each agent's experiences, the outcomes of their actions on the world. | Conjecture and criticism. If our best explanation needs it, it exists: if it kicks back, it is real. |
| One world or many? | One world, which no single description captures from outside. | Many. Our universe is one layer of a multiverse, revealed by quantum interference. |
| Is reality independent of observers? | Qualified. The world is real, but quantum states are personal to each agent. | Yes. Observers are physical systems inside reality, governed by the same laws. |
Further reading
- Hans Christian von Baeyer, QBism: The Future of Quantum Physics (2016), an introduction.
- Christopher A. Fuchs, N. David Mermin and Rüdiger Schack, "An introduction to QBism with an application to the locality of quantum mechanics", American Journal of Physics (2014).
- The Bayesians page on the knowledge site, for Deutsch's wider case against degrees of belief.